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Recent evolutionary perspectives on guilt tend to focus on how guilt functions as a means for the 
individual to self-regulate behavior and as a mechanism for reinforcing cooperative tendencies. 
While these accounts highlight important dimensions of guilt and provide important insights into 
its evolutionary emergence, they pay scant attention to the large empirical literature on its 
maladaptive effects on individuals. This paper considers the nature of guilt, explores its 
biological function, and provides an evolutionary perspective on whether it is an individual-level 
or group selected trait. After surveying philosophical and psychological analyses of guilt, we 
consider which psychological mechanisms underlie the capacity to experience and act from guilt 
and whether they point to an emergence of guilt in early humans or to guilt having a longer 
phylogenetic history. Because guilt is a distinctively social emotion, we then examine its 
contemporary role in social and legal contexts, which may provide clues to its original biological 
function. Finally, we provide the outlines of two evolutionary explanations for guilt. We argue 
that group selection may have promoted the capacity to experience guilt, but that under certain 
conditions there may have been a positive individual selection force as well. 
 
1. Introduction  
Guilt plays an important role in human social life. Feelings of guilt motivate us to perform 
reparative behaviors when we have harmed others, they signal to others that we hold the proper 
attitude toward accepted social norms, and the anticipation of guilt can counteract impulses to 
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shirk responsibilities, cheat cooperative arrangements, or violate communal rules. Recent 
evolutionary perspectives on guilt tend to focus predominantly on how guilt functions as a means 
for the individual to self-regulate behavior and as a mechanism for reinforcing cooperative 
tendencies (Frank, 1988; Joyce, 2006; Krebs, 2011). These accounts purport to show that guilt 
has a straightforward individual-level explanation insofar as it serves as a powerful 
counterweight to urges to violate group norms and motivates one to repair damage to intergroup 
relationships caused by one’s actions. While these accounts highlight important dimensions of 
guilt and provide important insights into its evolutionary emergence, they tend to pay scant 
attention to the large empirical literature on its potential maladaptive effects on the individual.  
 Guilt can be costly due to some actions it may impel us to perform. For example, it can 
prompt us to confess our transgressions, despite the absence of witnesses. This can be a risky 
measure, sometimes incurring scorn, social exile, or other forms of punishment. Further, guilt 
often is associated with maladaptive psychological effects, including psychopathology (Averill, 
Diefenbach, Stanley, Breckenridge, & Lusby, 2002; Bybee & Quiles, 1998; Harder, 1995; 
Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995; Luyten, Fontaine, & Corveleyn, 2002). When these 
maladaptive effects are brought into relief, it becomes less clear from an evolutionary standpoint 
that guilt-prone individuals would do better than their guiltless counterparts. Now, just because 
an emotion may occasionally be psychologically maladaptive does not entail that it is not a 
biological adaptation; for instance, despite its connection to psychologically maladaptive 
behavior, the emotion of shame has been given plausible adaptationist explanations (Fessler, 
2007). Perhaps something similar can be suggested for guilt: the capacity for guilt is an 
adaptation that facilitated and enhanced cooperation by strengthening social bonds, and any 
maladaptive effects are just by-products of a mismatch between this capacity and contemporary 
social conditions (O’Connor, 2000). But this explanation may rely too strongly on the ex ante 
assumption that maladaptive effects of guilt are not due to selective pressures. We contend that 
any adequate evolutionary explanation of guilt must also account for such psychological and 
potentially biologically maladaptive effects on individuals.   
 Guilt therefore presents us with an evolutionary puzzle. It seems that it is good for you 
that others are guilt-prone. And while there are clear ways in which guilt is good for groups of 
individuals, it is less clear that being guilt-prone is good for the individuals themselves. In 
exploring this puzzle, we consider the nature of guilt, explore its biological function, and provide 
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an evolutionary perspective on whether it is an individual-level or group selected trait. We begin 
by surveying philosophical and psychological analyses of guilt before arriving at a clear 
conception of guilt (section 2). Against this background, we turn to the question of which 
psychological mechanisms underlie the capacity to experience and act from guilt, considering 
whether the evidence points to an emergence of guilt in early humans or whether guilt has a 
longer phylogenetic history (section 3). Because guilt is a social emotion, we then examine its 
contemporary role in social and legal contexts, which may provide clues to what its original 
function may have been (section 4). Finally, we provide the outlines of two evolutionary 
explanations for guilt (section 5). We argue that if the evolution of guilt preceded the origin of 
our species, group selection may have promoted the capacity to experience guilt, but if guilt is a 
recent evolutionary innovation, then the emotion may have an evolutionary origin based 
mostly—or even exclusively—on individual-level selection.1 
 
2. The Nature of Guilt 
In order to provide an account of the evolutionary origins of guilt, we must first have a clear 
conception of guilt as well as its expression and motivational profile. If guilt is not a discrete 
emotion, any attempt at an evolutionary account exclusively focused on guilt will be moot. We 
argue in this section that guilt is distinct from other dysphoric emotions, focusing on the contrast 
between guilt and shame, since the latter is the emotion most closely related to—and often 
conflated with—guilt. We show that these emotions can be distinguished conceptually and 
empirically according to how one views the self in experiences of shame and guilt, how each 
emotion is expressed, and the kinds of actions these emotions tend to motivate. 
 
2.1. Focus and Elicitors of Guilt 
While guilt and shame appear to be conceptually distinct, differentiating them empirically has 
proved a difficult task. Within clinical settings, for example, patients sometimes conflate shame 
and guilt, describing shame experiences in terms of guilt, and vice versa. In these and other 
cases, guilt often serves as an umbrella term when characterizing one’s dysphoric affective state 
(Wicker, Payne, & Morgan, 1983; Harder & Zalma, 1990; Tracy & Robins, 2006). A commonly 
held view among psychologists is that shame focuses on one’s whole self or core identity while 
guilt focuses only on particular actions or behaviors for which the subject bears some 
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responsibility (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barrow, 
1996). The conceptualization of shame as self-focused and guilt as action-focused remains a 
dominant paradigm in psychological theory and clinical research. However, the neatness of this 
picture is purchased at the cost of neglecting important self-focused dimensions of guilt. Helen 
Block Lewis, who is often credited with developing this paradigm, presents a more fine-grained 
view of guilt: guilt involves less division or disorganization of the self than shame but 
nonetheless, like shame, has the self as part of its focus (1971, 1989; cf. Teroni & Deonna, 
2008). Because experiences of guilt focus on both the self and actions for which the self is 
perceived to be responsible, some researchers have conceived of guilt as focused on the self as 
agent (Barrett, 1995; Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Zinner, 2007). Experiences of guilt often 
include a diminished sense of self-worth and dissatisfaction with certain qualities of the self that 
may have contributed to the motivation or intention behind the action in question (Amodio, 
Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007). Guilt seems to require some degree of self-appraisal—one 
must view oneself as responsible for an action or event in order for feelings of guilt to arise 
(Katchadourian, 2010). Thus, rather than characterize shame and guilt as self-focused and action-
focused, respectively, we suggest that it is more useful to conceive of shame as focused on the 
self qua object, and guilt on the self qua agent. 
 The disparate foci of shame and guilt show another way to distinguish them, namely, by 
their eliciting conditions. Guilt is generated from the perceived violation of some normative 
standard one has internalized or for which one antecedently cares. To experience guilt, one 
typically takes responsibility for having committed the violation in question, believing one could 
have done otherwise (Lewis, 1989; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995). Some 
psychologists and philosophers have also noted that experiences of guilt often include the 
unpleasant feeling that one’s action or behavior is objectionable from the perspective of others, 
that one is unjustified and defenseless before such objections, and, perhaps, that one is deserving 
of scorn and punishment (Moore, 1987; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Joyce, 2006). 
Unlike guilt, shame need not be associated with some action or behavior for which one takes 
oneself to be responsible. Shame arises from one’s perceived shortcomings in living up to either 
an ideal one has adopted for oneself or to the expectations of others (Keltner & Buswell, 1996). 
There is some debate in the literature on how effectively one can distinguish guilt and shame 
based on eliciting conditions alone (Tangney, 1996; Tracy & Robins, 2006); however, Keltner 
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and Buswell’s (1996) wide-ranging study on the elicitors of shame and guilt shows that while the 
two emotions share several antecedents, their most common antecedents are distinct. 
 
2.2. Signaling Guilt 
Guilt and shame are also distinguishable by associated external expressions. What actions do 
persons tend to perform when experiencing guilt or shame? Action tendencies of shame range 
from attempts to conceal one’s failure or flaw, to more extreme acts of social withdrawal 
(Barrett, 1995; Tangney, 1995). Guilt, in contrast, motivates remedial actions of restitution and 
atonement, particularly toward those who were harmed by one’s behavior (Lindsay-Hartz, de 
Rivera, Mascolo, 1995; Katchadourian, 2010), as well as verbal gestures such as confessing to, 
or apologizing for, a violation. Feeling guilty can even motivate self-punitive actions, such as 
turning oneself in and accepting external punishment for wrongdoing, or self-inflicted harm 
under the assumption of a need for penance. 
 In addition to distinct action tendencies, we might wonder whether shame and 
guilt have stereotyped facial or bodily expression. Clinical research and empirical studies suggest 
that shame is reliably linked to both. Characteristic facial indicators of shame include gaze 
aversion and blushing in the presence of others (Lewis, 1971; Barrett, 1995). Common bodily 
displays of shame include slumping of the shoulders, smaller posture, and lower vocalic patterns 
(Scherer, 1986; Barrett, 1995). Studies have shown that observers can reliably identify 
experiences of shame in others based on such expressions (Keltner, 1995; Keltner & Buswell, 
1996). In contrast, it is not clear that guilt involves any characteristic facial or bodily expression. 
While some researchers have suggested that guilt feelings are often accompanied by elevated 
heart rate and irregular respiration (Ekman et al., 1983; Barrett, 1995), studies have not isolated 
reliable facial or bodily indicators of guilt. For example, Keltner and Buswell (1996) found that 
observers could not reliably identify guilt in photos of facial displays showing candidate 
expressions of guilt, whereas they could with shame and embarrassment. In a study using actors 
to perform bodily movements thought to communicate emotional states to observers, Wallbott 
(1998) discovered that while many emotions were reliably conveyed to and identified by test 
subjects, guilt was not among them. These studies appear to confirm the growing consensus that 
there is no reliable, stereotyped display of guilt (Keltner & Harker, 1998; Fessler & Haley, 2003; 
Kochanska & Aksan, 2006; Ferguson, Brugman, White, & Eyre, 2007). This has led several 
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researchers to conclude that signaling of guilt is primarily verbal and behavioral, communicated 
voluntarily by word (e.g., apology) or action (e.g., attempts at reparation or expiation) 
(Malatesta, 1990; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990; , 1995).The foregoing considerations of the 
difference between guilt and shame are useful for arriving at a clearer conception of the emotion 
of guilt. Guilt is a negative affect arising from perceiving that one has violated a normative 
standard. Its focus is on the agential self and the action that counts as a transgression. Guilt 
typically involves an acknowledgment of one’s responsibility for wrongdoing and the feeling of 
being defenseless against the anger and indignation of others, and of having no right to be spared 
of these negative emotions or punishment. Guilt tends to motivate reparative acts, such as 
apology, confession of wrongdoing, turning oneself in, or even costly endorsement of external 
punishment or self-inflicted harm.  
 It is clear on both empirical and philosophical grounds, then, that guilt is a unique 
emotion, distinct from shame and other dysphoric emotions.2 Seeking an evolutionary origin for 
guilt is therefore justified and may shed considerable light on guilt’s nature and function.3 The 
first step of such an account is to ask which psychological mechanisms serve as enabling 
conditions for experiencing guilt, a task to which we now turn. 
 
3. Ontogenetic and Phylogenetic Considerations 
Investigating the evolution of guilt in humans involves consideration of comparative research on 
related or similar traits in other primates. In this section, we briefly consider the psychological 
mechanisms commonly taken to be required for, or to emerge codevelopmentally with, 
experiences of guilt in humans. This will help in determining whether there are discernible 
evolutionary antecedents to guilt in other primates. 
 
3.1. Psychological and Neuroscientific Data 
Empirical research on guilt experiences within developmental psychology and neuroscience 
reveals them to be the product of complex cognitive processes. Several studies on the 
development of guilt in children show that guilt-proneness and the capacity to recognize 
expressions of guilt in others emerge relatively late in childhood, well after children have 
developed capacities for experiencing and recognizing many other emotions, including sadness, 
happiness, and shame (Harris, 1989; Zahn-Waxler & Kochanska, 1990; Barrett, 1998). Harris 
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form is published in Philosophical Psychology. Please quote only 
the published version, which is available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2015.1126706  
	7	
(1989) and Ferguson, Stegge, and Damhuis (1997) found that children first begin to exhibit the 
capacity to recognize appropriate situations for feeling guilt no earlier than the age of seven and 
as late as the age of ten, only after they are capable of attributing to themselves responsibility for 
actions and evaluating their actions and those of others according to normative standards. These 
findings are consistent with other empirical studies in developmental psychology that locate the 
emergence of the capacity for guilt subsequent to the emergence of capacities for complex 
representations of the self and distinguishing the self from others, for attributing to oneself causal 
responsibility for one’s actions and their consequences, and for empathic concern (Zahn-Waxler 
& Kochanska, 1990; Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002; Lagattuta & Thompson, 2007). 
These studies show that the capacity to experience guilt is either dependent on, or closely 
associated with, other cognitive benchmarks that are met at earlier stages of human childhood 
development. The extant developmental research, therefore, suggests that guilt is a cognitively 
complex emotion in humans, emerging after a number of psychological capacities have 
developed. 
 Recent work in neuroimaging has shown that several parts of the brain are active during 
experiences of guilt, including the superior temporal sulcus and anterior prefrontal cortex (Shin 
et al., 2000; Takahashi et al., 2004; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Zahn, & Grafman, 2008). Through 
EEG recording, Amodio, Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2007) discovered a unique link between 
increased guilt and reduced left-frontal cortical asymmetry, which they found did not similarly 
obtain in experiences of anxiety, sadness, and other-directed negative affects. The reduced 
asymmetry between left- and right-frontal cortical activity during guilt experiences suggests that 
guilt is associated with both approach and withdrawal orientation, motiving a complex sequence 
of self-regulatory and reparative behaviors. These results are consistent with more theoretical 
neurobiological views that take guilt to be an effect of the integrated operation of subcortical and 
neocortical processes, enabling highly cognitive activities such as taking the perspective of 
others, looking backward at one’s transgression, and planning and executing long-term responses 
to wrongdoing (Panksepp & Biven, 2012).  
 These empirical studies in developmental psychology and neuroscience thus show guilt 
in humans to be a psychologically complex emotion dependent on, or developmentally co-
emergent with, a number of cognitive processes. Given the psychological complexity of guilt, we 
should ask whether experiencing guilt is uniquely human, since, as we argue below, how 
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recently guilt evolved is crucial to understanding the kinds of selection pressures that likely 
shaped the emotion. 
 
3.2. Guilt in Other Primates 
Other primates appear to possess at least some of the capacities that are required for or are 
closely associated with guilt experience in humans. For example, researchers point to evidence 
that some nonhuman primates possess something like a theory of mind (Cheney & Seyfarth, 
2007; Call & Tomasello, 2008), are capable of self-recognition (Kaneko & Tomonaga, 2011), 
and even internalize some social rules (de Waal, 1996). While there may be evidence for these 
capacities in other primates, is there evidence that nonhuman primates experience guilt?  
 Perhaps the best indication would be cases in which other primates appear to discriminate 
certain social rules and display appeasement behavior whenever they breech those rules and 
subsequently encounter a dominant conspecific. A well-known example is Coe and Rosenblum’s 
(1984) experimental observations of subordinate macaques’ mating behavior. When the 
dominant male macaque was present but contained by the experimenters, the subordinates did 
not attempt to mate with females. In the dominant male’s absence, however, the subordinates 
initiated mating displays and behaviors. Upon the dominant male’s return, the subordinates 
behaved more submissively toward him than they did prior to the surreptitious mating. Coe and 
Rosenblum concluded that macaques recognize violations of those social rules and accordingly 
perform appeasement behaviors. Boehm (2012) relates a similar example from his time studying 
chimpanzees in Gombe. After copulating with a female, adolescent male chimps would furtively 
glance at the dominant male, putting on displays of appeasement despite having kept the act out 
of sight. De Waal (1996) interprets such behaviors as expressing a concern about the rule 
enforcer’s reaction even when he is not present. De Waal suggests that this concern may indicate 
the evolutionary starting point among primates for the capacity for shame and guilt. Boehm, 
however, explains the subordinate males’ behavior in terms of fear of discovery and subsequent 
punishment rather than of recognition of rule-violation. In either case, violations of primate troop 
rules followed by appeasement displays do not themselves provide sufficient evidence to 
conclude that some nonhuman primates have guilt-like experiences. 
 Fessler and Gervais (2010) leave open the possibility that other primates are equipped 
with a guilt-like mechanism that may explain reconciliation behaviors toward conspecifics. 
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However, they argue that humans possess a unique capacity for what they call “normative guilt,” 
which they understand to be elicited by violating norms in the absence of an audience. In place 
of an actual person or group that their transgressions harm, humans often form mental 
representations of culturally constructed agents or social groups before whom reparations and 
atonement ought to be performed. Fessler and Gervais suggest that the complexity and social 
nature of these representations reveal a significant gap between human emotional capacity—
particularly with respect to guilt—and that of other primates. 
 Does the psychological complexity and late developmental emergence of guilt in humans 
then suggest that the emotion is not present in closely related primates? Some philosophers 
answer this question in the affirmative (e.g., Joyce, 2006). We agree that the foregoing 
primatological and anthropological considerations suggest that the available data, at best, are 
inconclusive as to whether other primates experience guilt or some form of proto-guilt. However, 
the observed behavioral homologies between humans and some other primates do not permit us 
to rule out altogether a similar, guilt-like psychological mechanism in other primates.4 We 
therefore consider below both scenarios—a phylogenetically early and a late origin of guilt—in 
forming our conclusion about how guilt might have evolved. Because there are grounds for 
thinking that guilt is a uniquely human emotion, arising from phylogenetically novel interactions 
between intricate cognitive machinery and complex social arrangements, we will investigate in 
some detail below what role guilt plays in human social structures, in which contexts it is 
adaptive, and who benefits from individuals being guilt-prone. This will allow us to develop a 
scenario for a uniquely human evolution of guilt, which we can contrast with its phylogenetically 
deep alternative account. 
 
4. Current Effects of Guilt  
Is there an individual-level payoff for feeling guilty in particular circumstances? There are three 
main ways that this question has been addressed in the literature. One is by constructing mock 
trials and surveying participants’ views about the punishment that the accused should receive. 
Another is through an examination of real trials and legal procedures in an attempt to see what 
role guilt plays for offenders and the legal determination of their fate. Third, these questions have 
been addressed through study of individuals outside the legal arena to see what role guilt plays in 
everyday life. We will address each of the three approaches in order to arrive at a broad 
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form is published in Philosophical Psychology. Please quote only 
the published version, which is available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2015.1126706  
	10	
understanding of how guilt functions in contemporary social contexts. 
 Before proceeding with an examination of the legal literature on guilt, three caveats are in 
order. First, ‘guilt’ is legally defined as being responsible for a criminal or civil offense. The 
moral emotion of guilt, though it might often be felt upon being guilty of an offense, bears no 
necessary link to the legal sense of guilt. To keep the two senses of ‘guilt’ distinct, we will use 
the term ‘guiltL’ to denote guilt in the legal sense, while ‘guilt’ will denote the emotion. Second, 
the legal literature often uses the term ‘remorse’ to denote expressions of guilt. We adopt this 
convention in our discussion here. Third, if there are no stereotyped bodily indicators of guilt 
(see section 2.2), then those studies discussed below that use stereotyped criteria for remorse 
(crying, downcast eyes, etc.) will have inherent problems, since they may assume that these 
displays typically are expressions of guilt. 
 
4.1. Guilt in Mock Court Cases  
To better understand the role of remorse in sentencing and punishment, let’s break our discussion 
of mock court cases into two parts: (1) the determination of guiltL, and (2) the determination of 
punishment. What role do expressions of remorse play in the determinations of guiltL? The 
impact is often negative, and while being responsible for an outcome often leads to remorse, bad 
outcomes for which one is not responsible can also lead to remorse (Bornstein, Rung, & Miller, 
2002; Jehle, Miller, & Kemmelmeier, 2009). There is a key variable that is important in 
determining the effect of remorse: the context and timing of the display of remorse. One might 
exhibit remorse at the time of the incident or the time of the trial, for instance. Expressing 
remorse at the time of the incident implies guiltL more strongly than exhibiting remorse 
subsequently, at the trial (Bornstein, Rung & Miller, 2002). But any remorse expressed at any 
time postincident may be interpreted as a sign of guiltL. 
 Now consider individuals who have already received a guilty verdict or who are 
presumed guilty. What are the costs and benefits for expressing guilt? For one, the punishment 
the accused receives will generally be reduced (Gold & Weiner, 2000; Robinson, Smith-Lovin, 
& Tsoudis, 1994; Garvey, 1998). The degree to which the remorse expressions modulate 
punishment is affected by a number of factors. If the incident is not all that severe, if it involves a 
significant degree of chance, or if it is otherwise indicated that the behavior does not represent 
the perceived moral character of the accused, then remorse is apt to result in a decrease of 
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punishment. If, on the other hand, the behavior is severe or does not involve significant elements 
of chance, then it is more apt to be viewed as the product of the accused’s character. When the 
behavior is viewed as stemming from the putative character of the accused, the punishment may 
be lowered, but it will not be lowered to the degree that it would were it not perceived as part of 
the accused’s character. 
 In sum, remorse often increases the chance that one is found guiltyL of a transgression in 
mock trial cases, but it tends to reduce the punishment of one already accused or presumed 
guiltyL. Because remorse cuts both ways, the answer to the question of whether it is good overall 
to express remorse will be determined by the strength of the factors discussed above, especially 
the degree to which the guiltL of the accused is in question. For example, expressing remorse in a 
small community, or where one is caught red-handed, is probably on average more beneficial for 
the accused than expressing remorse in a case where the evidence is tenuous and/or the accused 
is completely unknown to the jury. This of course places the wrongly accused in a bind 
(Weisman, 2004). They may naturally lack remorse due to their lack of guiltL, and while a lack 
of remorse may serve as evidence for their lack of guiltL, failing to express remorse has a strong 
chance of backfiring. 
 
4.2. Guilt in Law and Punishment  
The mock jury cases clearly show that we wish to punish remorseless offenders more than 
remorseful ones. And there are numerous actual cases in which a lack of remorse has led to a 
prolonged sentence. Displays of remorse appear to be more helpful for a first-time offender than 
for a recidivist, perhaps because the first time offender is more credible (Harrel, 1981). And 
remorse plays a greater role for mitigating the punishment of less vicious crimes than extremely 
vicious ones (Eisenberg, Garvey, & Wells, 1998). We thus wish to—and often do—punish the 
remorseless more severely, but why?  
 One suggestion is that remorselessness correlates with recidivism, though the empirical 
support linking the two is not as strong as one might imagine (Cox, 1999). Studies that have 
looked for a link between remorse (or related emotional displays, like that of empathy) and lower 
chance of recidivism often come up short of establishing a link. For example, Hanson and 
Bussière (1998) couldn’t find any evidence for a link between displays of empathy toward the 
victim and lower recidivism rates for sexual offenders. 
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 A lack of evidence for a link between remorselessness and recidivism in these studies, 
however, is not proof that no link obtains. It could be that the right studies have yet to be 
conducted. In fact, Hosser, Windzio, and Greve (2008) interviewed 1,243 prisoners during their 
incarceration and found that feelings of guilt early in their prison terms were negatively 
correlated with recidivism, whereas feelings of shame were positively correlated with recidivism. 
This shows both that remorse may in fact indicate a reduced probability of recidivism as long as 
it is a genuine display of guilt, and that there are drawbacks with using ‘remorse’ as an umbrella 
term for feeling bad subsequent to committing an offense, since if guilt and shame pull in 
opposite directions, a failure to distinguish them will lead one to fail to discover their causal role. 
This study also points to the importance of distinguishing genuine feelings of guilt from mere 
putative expressions of remorse. Offenders will generally use remorseful displays strategically 
prior to and during trials, and such displays may thus carry little information about feelings of 
guilt, whereas this study, which surveyed prisoners posttrial (where admissions of guilt/shame 
presumably do not affect their fate), does a better job at discovering the emotional lives of the 
incarcerated. Other recent studies also show a significant inverse relation between recidivism and 
moral cognition as well as between recidivism and the experience of moral emotions (with the 
former effect being larger than the latter) (Van Vugt et al., 2011). It also appears that expressing 
remorse in conjunction with an apology can help bring about forgiveness and closure for the 
victim and/or their family and friends (Bibas & Bierschbach, 2004; Orleans & Gurtman, 1984). 	 In	sum,	feelings	of	guilt	negatively	correlate	with	recidivism	rates.	This	provides	justification	for	treating	differently	those	who	express	genuine	guilt	and	points	to	important	selection	pressures	in	the	evolution	of	guilt.	To	expand	our	understanding	of	the	role	of	guilt,	let’s	now	move	outside	the	confines	of	the	legal	system	and	consider	the	question	of	what	the	consequence	of	being	guilt-prone	is	for	individuals	and	the	groups	to	which	they	belong.	
 
4.3. Effects of Being Guilt-prone  
Individuals who score high in guilt-proneness, as measured by the Guilt and Shame Proneness 
Scale tend to exhibit less counterproductive and delinquent behaviors than those who are less 
guilt-prone (Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011; Cohen, Panter, & Turan, 2012). Similarly, 
Malti and Krettenauer (2013) conclude that there is a positive relation between feelings of guilt 
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and prosocial behavior. Svensson, Weerman, Pauwels, Bruinsma, and Bernasco (2013) found 
that the anticipation of feelings of guilt serves as a deterrent to committing offenses. There is 
also some evidence that being guilt-prone makes one more apt to take on the role of a leader, and 
guilt-prone individuals are more likely to be selected for leadership positions (Schaumberg & 
Flynn, 2012). But given that one is prone to guilt, what effect does experiencing guilt have for 
subsequent behavior? Comparing guilt and shame, Silfver (2007) found that guilt is more likely 
to lead to reparative prosocial behavior than shame. And it appears that feelings of guilt make 
one more apt to perform altruistic acts (Regan, 1971) and to be more compliant (Carlsmith & 
Gross, 1969). 
 There appears to be an interesting interaction between reputation and expressions of 
remorse. Individually, exhibiting remorse or having a good reputation is sufficient for regarding 
the individual as likable, but only the combination of remorse and a good reputation was 
sufficient to mitigate punishment (Darby & Schlenker, 1989). Those with a bad reputation may 
be regarded as feigning remorse merely to reduce their punishment, while those with a good 
reputation are apt to have their remorse judged to be genuine. 
 In sum, it appears to be good when others are guilt-prone: it prevents their inefficient, 
counterproductive, or deleterious behavior, and prompts reparation and altruism. There is thus a 
clear benefit to individuals for belonging to a group composed of guilt-prone individuals. But 
many of the characteristics that make it individually good to belong to such a group may also 
provide benefits to the group itself such that groups composed of guilt-prone individuals should 
outperform other groups not so composed, making guilt-proneness good at the group level. In 
order to assess the group-level costs and benefits of being composed of guilt-prone individuals, 
as well as the individual-level consequences of being guilt-prone, we need to synthesize the full 
array of results from the previous sections, which we do in the following section. 
 
5. Guilt by Association?  
The previous sections evince the complex role that guilt plays at the individual and group levels, 
and we will now consider what their results imply about the evolution of guilt. We will take 
ancestral humans as our starting point, since, as we saw in section 3, there is reason to think guilt 
may have evolved relatively recently and may be unique to humans. We are not foreclosing an 
earlier origin of guilt, but instead are taking what we understand to be the more plausible 
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option—guilt arising within the human lineage. We return to the consideration of an earlier 
origin when we present our conclusion. Since we are taking data from contemporary social 
contexts and speculating about what occurred in our deep evolutionary past, the conclusions we 
arrive at in this section are tentative. Nevertheless, we are confident that the data point to one or 
more plausible evolutionary scenarios. 
 
5.1. Group-Level Benefits of Guilt  
Group selection theory has had a complex and highly contested history (Okasha, 2006). Prior to 
the mid-1960s, group selection explanations were part of a standard explanatory toolbox—traits, 
it was thought, could be explained by pointing out that they are good for the group or good for 
the species. With the publication of Williams (1966), group selection explanations received a 
devastating critique, leaving such explanations proscribed in biology through the 1970s and 
1980s. Group selection explanations have recently regained some legitimacy, particularly 
through the work of philosophers and biologists on the evolution of altruism and human 
cooperation (Sober & Wilson, 1998; Sterelny, 2003). In what follows, we will not directly 
engage with this debate, but will assume that group selection is explanatorily admissible and can 
be cogently modeled. 
 To see whether a case can be made that being composed of guilt-prone individuals 
(henceforth GPIs) is a group-level benefit, consider the following benefits, discussed above in 
sections 2 and 4: 
A. GPIs are more efficient. Since it is a group-level benefit to be composed of efficient 
members, it is a benefit to have members who are guilt-prone.  
 
B. GPIs are more likely to reveal their offenses. This is beneficial for groups because it 
will lead to greater exposure and punishment of offenders. This has the benefit of 
reducing recidivation rates of offenders and will also help deter other individuals from 
committing like offenses.  
 
C. GPIs are more likely to reveal that they know they have committed a wrong. For many 
offenses, the identity of the offender will not be a mystery. In such cases, guilt will not be 
needed in order to reveal the identity of the offender. But in such cases, guilt nevertheless 
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has a positive role to play. If the individual who committed the wrong expresses feelings 
of guilt, then group members gain the information that the offender knows its actions to 
be wrong and will therefore not be apt to recidivate. 
 
D. GPIs exhibit a greater degree of prosocial and altruistic behavior. If it is better for a 
group to be composed of highly prosocial and altruistic individuals, as it seems to be, 
then the link between guilt-proneness and prosociality/altruism implies that GPIs are 
good for the group.  
 
E. GPIs are deterred from offending. GPIs who recognize themselves as guilt-prone, and 
know the psychological pain associated with guilt and/or the way that guilt leads one to 
reveal their offenses, will be less apt to commit an offense than a non-GPI. 
 
F. GPIs are more apt to be chosen as leaders and to take on leadership roles. Having 
GPIs in leadership roles is generally beneficial for the group because characteristics A-E 
are especially important in leadership roles, where the stakes are high. 
 
Each of these features of GPIs has a clear group benefit. But before we conclude that there is net 
positive group selection for groups composed of GPIs, we must first ask whether any of these 
features of GPIs have negative effects on the fitness of groups.  
 Of the above features of GPIs, the two that are most apt to have a negative effect on the 
group are the increased propensity to be altruistic, prosocial, and hesitant to commit offenses (D 
and E). Although this will generally be good within the group, it will not always be beneficial 
between groups. If groups of individuals are competing with one another, having GPIs 
indiscriminately dispense benefits to others independently of which group they belong to may be 
detrimental to their group. Individuals will occasionally be called upon to fight or harm others, 
and if being guilt-prone interferes with this, it can cause group-level problems. One way around 
this, however, is to conceptualize the norms, one’s group members, and outsiders in such a way 
that guilt is elicited only from harming members of one’s own group. At an extreme, one could 
consider members of one’s group to be human while classifying outsiders as nonhuman, thus 
decreasing the chance that one will feel guilty subsequent to violent acts toward the latter. It is 
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notable that some tribal groups have similarly constrained domains of those whom they consider 
to be humans, that patriotic fervor against foreigners can be fueled by referring to them as “evil” 
or “animals,” and that modern militaries strategically dehumanize the enemy to get their soldiers 
to fight more effectively. Thus, although GPIs can impede the group, there are effective ways for 
groups to harness the categories of us and them to sequester the guilty feelings for one’s group 
members. Given this, there are compelling reasons to think that the benefits groups gain from 
containing GPIs outweigh the costs, and that groups with GPIs will therefore outperform groups 
lacking GPIs.  
 Does this mean that we now have a story for the origin of guilt as a group selected 
emotion? We do have good reason to support the claim that guilt has a net positive effect on 
groups. If group selection models are tenable, then we can thus infer that guilt arose at least in 
part due to group-level selection processes. But before we can classify it strictly as a product of 
group selection, we must consider whether there is a compelling individual-level selection 
account of the origin and persistence of guilt. 
 
5.2. Individual-Level Benefits of Guilt 
Although there is strong evidence for a positive net selection pressure at the group level, the 
situation is not as clear at the individual level. Let’s begin by considering some reasons why it 
may be individually maladaptive to be a GPI. First, it is easy to see that B, D, and E can be 
maladaptive: it can be bad for individuals to reveal their offenses (B), especially if their 
punishment will be severe. Although it is often beneficial to be the recipient of prosocial 
behavior (D), it may be individually costly to perform such behavior. Finally, while it is 
beneficial to be deterred from offending (E), especially when one is likely to be caught, it can be 
individually advantageous to lack guilt. Even if lacking guilt can result in one being punished 
more often, there may be significant benefits to be reaped when one is not caught. Moreover, 
there is some evidence that non-GPIs will be able to shorten the duration of punishment more 
successfully than GPIs. Porter et al. (2009), for example, found that psychopathic offenders had a 
success rate for their applications for conditional release that was 2.5 times that of 
nonpsychopathic offenders. Psychopaths, lacking the burdens of guilt, are able without 
compunction to say anything they need to in order to get released from prison. The guilt-prone 
individuals are not so unrestricted in their pleas and are not as successful with their conditional 
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release. The psychopath’s success is especially striking in light of the fact that psychopathy is 
one of the strongest predictors of recidivism (Leistico, Salekin, DeCoster, & Rogers, 2008).  
 Now let’s consider in what ways it might be individually advantageous to be a GPI. 
Acting with efficiency (A) likely will be good for individuals, as they will be more apt to be held 
in high esteem. Similarly, as we saw in section 4, if an individual is known to have committed an 
offense, admitting that they recognize the wrong they committed (C) likely will be beneficial. 
And if being a GPI makes such an admission more probable and more sincere, then being guilt-
prone may be advantageous. Finally, since there is evidence that GPIs naturally take on 
leadership positions—and are more likely to be chosen as leaders—if there is a selective 
advantage for leaders, then this is further reason to think it is advantageous to be guilt-prone. 
 Let’s take stock. Of the six features of GPIs listed above, three seem to be individually 
maladaptive, while three appear adaptive. It looks like we are at a standoff with the net 
individual selection pressure at best being weak and without a clear direction. Is this the best we 
can do? Although we will conclude that the jury may still be out for the individual-level selection 
case, we think that some of the features identified as individually maladaptive (B, D, and E) may 
have an adaptive side. To see this, we will consider an argument for the adaptive nature of guilt 
provided by Robert Frank. 
 
5.3. A Problem for the Commitment Model  
We saw above that B, D, and E may be maladaptive: an individual who is likely to reveal their 
offenses (B), perform acts of altruism (D), or is deterred from offending (E) is apt to be less fit 
than an individual not so inclined. But is there a way that B, D, and E may have a net positive 
selective effect on individuals? To see how this might be the case, let’s consider Robert Frank’s 
(1988, 2001) commitment account of the strategic role of the emotions. 
 According to Frank, some of our emotions play a strategic role in cooperative relations, 
having evolved to solve what he calls “the commitment problem.” These moral emotions have a 
stabilizing effect on social arrangements because they motivate one to cooperate within joint 
ventures that yield benefits to most of the parties in the long run, and they signal to the other 
parties that one is disposed to cooperate rather than cheat or defect at the expense of the group. A 
function of guilt, specifically, is to counteract the attraction of immediate payoffs that come from 
defecting from a joint enterprise by representing and incentivizing future payoffs that come from 
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form is published in Philosophical Psychology. Please quote only 
the published version, which is available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09515089.2015.1126706  
	18	
cooperation. Of course, to reap the benefits of cooperative arrangements, parties must first be 
able reliably to recognize those individuals disposed to cooperate and those who might defect out 
of self-serving interests. In addition to good reputation, parties look for statistically reliable clues 
for proneness to moral emotions in the facial expressions of others, which helps them discern 
with whom to cooperate. Frank contends that moral emotions came under selection pressure to 
play this signaling role.5 
 For guilt to have been selected to help solve the commitment problem on Frank’s 
account, it must (a) help motivate cooperative behavior and (b) be associated with a reliable, 
hard to fake bodily expression or signal. There is some empirical support for (a). As we saw 
above, GPIs are less likely to commit offenses (E) and are more likely to reveal offenses that 
they have committed. Furthermore, Ketelaar and Clore (1997) and Ketelaar and Au (2003) found 
that experimentally manipulated experiences of guilt during social bargaining games is 
associated with increased cooperation among individuals who had committed one or more 
transgressions against their partner and among individuals who tended initially to be 
uncooperative. In another study, Amodio, Devine, and  Harmon-Jones (2007) found that guilt 
arising from transgressions of prejudice predicts an increased interest in prejudice-reducing and 
reparative behavior.  
Now consider Frank’s second criterion. There is an obvious problem with (b), as we have 
noted in section 2: guilt does not have a characteristic facial or bodily expression. What sort of 
facial expressions does Frank associate with guilt? He claims that a “furtive glance and difficulty 
making eye contact,” as well as blushing triggered by self-consciousness, are typical symptoms 
of guilt (1988, p. 126). However, as we noted above, psychologists tend to associate these facial 
expressions more with shame (and, occasionally, embarrassment) than with guilt. Does Frank 
then conflate guilt and shame? It is certainly possible that he does with respect to facial 
expression, and the lack of stereotyped expressions for guilt may undermine his view. 
 The benefit of Frank’s view for the individual-level selection story is that if one can 
reliably identify GPIs, then one will disproportionally select them for mutually beneficial 
cooperative ventures. And if GPIs are chosen and the non-GPIs tend to be left out, then it may be 
individually advantageous to be a GPI. Behaviors that are costly indicators of being a GPI (such 
as B, D, and E) may be offset if they will purchase admission to highly beneficial cooperative 
relationships. It seems, then, that there is good reason to think that Frank’s account of guilt is 
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only partly flawed. Because guilt does not have a universally recognized facial expression, it 
could not have been selected to solve the commitment problem in the way that Frank conceives 
it. 
 However, there may be other ways to reliably identify GPIs. While Frank is right that 
reputation is not always a good indicator of trustworthiness, the consilience of distinct sources of 
information about an individual’s character can provide a good picture of their emotional 
dispositions. If one (1) has information about an individual’s reputation, (2) has directly 
observed their behavior when acting with themselves and others, and (3) has heard them discuss 
their dealings with others, then it is going to be relatively easy to know how guilt-prone the 
individual is. And knowledge of this sort was unlikely to be out of reach for the small groups in 
which guilt presumably evolved. Moreover, acts of reparation, such as confession to 
wrongdoing, remediating harm, and self-inflicted penance, can be risky and costly for the 
individual. Supposing such behaviors constitute signals of guilt, then they may serve as reliable, 
hard to fake signals on account of the costs, time, and sustained motivation they require of the 
individual. 
 If this is true, then there is strong reason to believe that individual selection helped drive 
the evolution of guilt.6 We are left, then, with the conclusion that guilt was likely selected for at 
both the individual and group levels, and the presence and form of the emotion is due to the 
composite strength of these selection pressures.  
 
6. Conclusions  
We began with an evolutionary puzzle: why did guilt evolve if it is not obviously a good thing 
for the individual to be guilt-prone? We found that the first step in answering this question is to 
try to get clear on the nature of guilt and account for both its adaptive and its maladaptive effects. 
This showed that the answer is not a simple one; there is no obvious single candidate cause for 
the origin and maintenance of guilt, but instead two candidate causes—group and individual 
selection—each of which enjoys some plausibility. Group selection provides an almost 
uniformly positive selection pressure for groups of guilt-prone individuals, though it is not clear 
that the group selection vector could have been sufficiently strong to account for the evolution of 
the emotion. While group selection can promote guilt-proneness in the absence of language and 
culture, it is not clear that individual selection could have a net positive selection force without 
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language and culture. The reason for this is that language and culture allow individuals to tell 
stories about how they felt and acted due to their own or other’s transgressions. Additionally, 
language enables social transmission about reputations and dramatically increases the available 
information about the guilt-proneness of others in one’s group. Without such information, 
reliably choosing guilt-prone individuals for cooperative ventures would be all but impossible, 
especially since there are no stereotyped, reliable bodily and facial expressions of guilt. 
 The state of the research, therefore, does not overwhelmingly support either an 
individual- or group-level account. But it does support the following pair of conditionals. If guilt 
is phylogenetically widespread (occurring in nonhuman primates and perhaps other related taxa), 
then it probably evolved as a response to group-level selection pressures. If instead guilt evolved 
recently within the hominin lineage, then individual-level evolutionary accounts could explain 
the evolution of guilt.  
 This pair of conditionals suggests a host of empirical and theoretical avenues of enquiry 
that bear on the story of guilt. More work on the individual- and group-level models of guilt is 
needed to fully assess the strength of the selection pressures. (For example, is the space of 
parameter values for a group selection account large enough for us to accord group selection 
sufficient, enduring power to produce a guilt-prone phenotype? Can an individual-level model 
account for the maladaptive behaviors that guilt induces?) And more work on the comparative 
biology of guilt will help resolve the debate about whether guilt is confined to the hominin 
lineage. If guilt or something akin to guilt-proneness is not unique to humans, then evolutionary 
scenarios requiring complex social cognition (e.g., tracking reputation, being aware of social 
norms and discriminating transgressions) are not going to be available to explain how guilt arose 
in primates. The evolutionary story of guilt is thus far from being fully understood, but we are 
optimistic that our analysis here will help contextualize and show the implications for the 
emerging research on guilt.  
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1 In giving an evolutionary account of guilt, we are not denying that the development and 
expression of guilt in humans is powerfully modulated by social and cultural contexts. 
 
2 For a helpful discussion of the conceptual issues involved in developing criteria for empirically 
differentiating guilt and shame, see Teroni and Deonna (2008). 
 
3 An evolutionary account of guilt also can contribute to functionalist approaches in psychology, 
which focus primarily on the social role played by guilt-induced behaviors (Tangney, 1996; 
Barrett, 1995; Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1998). 
 
4 On positing similar psychological mechanisms underlying behavioral homologies across 
humans and other primates, see de Waal (2006). But cf. Sober (1993). 
 
5 While Frank offers two possible pathways for the evolution of social emotions like guilt, one 
based on reputation and the other on signaling, we focus on the latter. Frank’s reputation account 
holds that a reputation for not cheating could have emerged as a means for reliably identifying 
individuals who experience moral sentiments. However, this would not explain why guilt-
proneness would have been favored specifically. 
 
6 That the communication of information about the guilt-proneness of individuals may require 
advanced cognitive and linguistic capacities among humans does not entail that these same 
capacities would be required for communicating similar information among other primate 
groups. As we noted in section 3.2, the extant evidence is inconclusive as to whether a guilt-like 
mechanism is present in nonhuman primates, with scientists and philosophers in considerable 
disagreement as to how to interpret that evidence. Supposing other primates have guilt-like 
experiences, it is possible that information about those experiences is communicable to 
conspecifics through nonlinguistic means, such as the submission behaviors frequently exhibited 
by subordinates.												
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